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TRUST, COMMUNICATION AND EQULIBRIUM BEHAVIOUR
IN PUBLIC GOODS GAME: A CROSS-COUNTRY
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
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Abstract. This paper reports a novel cross-cultural public goods game ex-
periment played in real time through Internet. Web-based software was used
to compare the contributions to public good of diﬀerent groups of participants:
mixed, consisting of both Italians (students in law and economics) and Rus-
sians (students in economics), as well as all-Italian and all-Russian groups.
This setup allows for testing for a number of eﬀects, including participants’
awareness of the group composition in terms of nationality and gender of group
members; possibility of coordination of one’s strategy during a cheap talk ses-
sion organized before some of the games was used as an additional control. Our
results show that the degree of cooperation is rather high, but does not vary
signiﬁcantly with nationalities of the group members, while communication
tends to enhance contributions to public goods. A notable diﬀerence between
the subjects representing the two nations is an overly strong and increasing
cooperativeness of the Russian female participants in contrast to that of the
Russian men, as well as the Italians.
1. Introduction
Experimental data convincingly show that individual behaviour frequently de-
parts from the benchmark model of a selﬁsh economic man. Yet the exact bound-
aries of selﬁshness, as well as the institutional or cultural determinants of selﬁsh
vs. cooperative behaviour remain at large unexplored - as John Ledyard concisely
put it, ”the debate has been long-standing with much heat and little light” (Led-
yard, 1995, p.121). This paper contributes to that research using new technology
of cross-cultural experimentation in the framework of the public goods game.
Cultural anthropologists and psychologists have a long tradition of such ex-
periments, dating back to early XXth century. Economists began a systematic
exploration of country eﬀects only in the last couple of decades. Perhaps the ﬁrst
and most important lesson of these experiments was that people’s behaviour tends
to be fundamentally uniform across countries, nations and continents. In other
words, the fundamental principles of rationality for the Americans are the same
as for the Chinese Kahelmeier and Shehata (1992), Slovenians, Israeli, or Japan-
ese (Roth e.a., 1991), Indonesians (Cameron, 1999) or Russians (Belianin, 1998).
Nevertheless there exist symptomatic diﬀerences among people with diﬀerent socio-
cultural background, e.g. diﬀerent attitudes towards risk, reciprocity or conﬁdence
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(Camerer, 1995). The most ambitious of these works (Henrich e.a., 2001) consists
of 15 ﬁeld studies of several games, such as ultimatum or public goods provision,
played mostly in remote areas with illiterate subjects.
This last example is rather speciﬁc; most of modern experiments are played
in computer classes. At the same time, cross-country coordination remains ’re-
mote’ in the sense that comparability is ensured by the uniformity of experimental
technique and design alone, which still leave some room for procedural diversity be-
yond experimenter’s control. Modern technologies, ﬁrst of all the Internet, provide
experimentalists with new experimental methods and tools. An experimental soft-
ware developed at one of our universities, (International College of Economics and
Finance (ICEF) of Higher School of Economics) allows for not just cross-country
comparison, but helps us to bring together people from diﬀerent countries in a single
’virtual’ experimental laboratory. The present paper reports the ﬁrst results of such
an experiment - the public goods game, played by the students from Italy (Univer-
sit` a del Piemonte Orientale (University of Eastern Piedmont) in Alessandria), and
Russia (ICEF, Higher School of Economics, Moscow).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the public goods game and
summarizes recent results obtained by numerous researchers in this area. Section
3 presents our experimental design, and the next section 4 summarized its results.
The ﬁnal section summarizes our ﬁndings.
2. The public goods game: experimental evidence
The public goods (PG) game has been introduced in modern experimental eco-
nomics by Marvell and Ames (1979), Isaac e.a. (1984), Kim and Walker (1984)
and others. The simplest, linear PG voluntary contributions game is conducted in
groups of n ≥ 2 players endowed with w experimental currency units (points) each.
The game consists of a number of periods, in which every player i independently of
the others bid any integer amount ci,0 ≥ ci ≥ w she wishes to the public account,
and retains the rest (w−ci). Each retained point contributes one to the ﬁnal utility
of that individual, while each unit deposited on public account is an increasing lin-
ear function of the number of points deposited by the entire group, k ·
P
i ci = α¯ c,
where ¯ c =
P
i ci
n is average contribution of the group and α = kn,k < 1 < kn.
Possible revenues from the public account are collected in a special table showing
the worth of public good for any amount of points contributed by group; this table
is made available to the individuals. Given the contributions vector c, total utility
of every individual is
(1) vi(c) = w − ci + α¯ c
Since 1 < kn, the eﬃcient outcome is to contribute everything to public account.
However, k < 1 implies that the game has a prisoner dilemma structure, and any
individual is better-oﬀ depositing nothing on that account in a single-period version
of this game. This result extends to any ﬁnitely repeated game, where backward
induction stipulates non-cooperative behaviour at every stage game, which is the
only subgame-perfect solution1.
This prediction of the standard theory, however, is not supported by the em-
pirical evidence. A typical pattern from the very ﬁrst experimental observations is
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the that the average initial bid is about 50%, but gradually decreases with repli-
cations. Further robust eﬀects include increase of contribution with higher return
from public good and communication between subjects, and decrease of contribu-
tions with repetitions within the same group, experience in diﬀerent groups and
training in economics (Ledyard, 1995). Similar trends were observed in other ver-
sions of this game, such as the threshold condition, where the (discrete) public
good is not created unless the sum of contributions
P
i ci reaches a predetermined
threshold ˆ c; or common pool resource (Henrich e.a., 2001): instead of contributing
to public good, each of n individuals can independently withdraw up to V/n from
the common pool of resources worth V points. Among less common examples, it is
worth citing a challenging experiment by Keser (2000): her experiment consisted of
three computer simulations of a PG game using strategies solicited from established
academics all over the world. ’Human’ subjects had a chance to revise their strate-
gies after each simulation. Despite the game structure implied nonzero equilibrium
contributions, the initial contributions were again above equilibrium, with uniform
decrease to the equilibrium level at the end.
Many researchers have investigated the eﬀects of experimental environment and
design in the PG game. Croson and Marx (2001) observed signiﬁcant eﬀect of the
recommended amount to contribute on actual contribution, which implies that these
can be aﬀected by exogenous non-obligatory signals. Further evidence conﬁrming
that publicly observed information can aﬀect bidding behaviour was obtained by
Moxnes and van der Heijden (2000) who played a public bad game with a publicly
known leader. Van Dijk e.a. (1996) observe higher social ties as a result of successful
cooperation. Earlier, Isaac e.a. (1988) found signiﬁcant increase of contribution as
a function of nonbinding communications (cheap-talks); symptomatically enough,
communication seems to enhance cooperation with repetitions, unlike the bench-
mark case.
Andeoni (1988), Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996) and Keser and van Winden (2000)
showed that a similar eﬀect can result simply from group member familiarity. Their
studies compare the standard PG design (e.g. ﬁve groups of four subjects in each, or
partners, played 25 rounds of the game) with the one where the same 20 individuals
were re-matched in ﬁve groups of equal size in each of the 25 rounds, so that the
opponents were (strangers). Evidence here is nonconclusive: Andreoni and Palfrey
and Prisbrey discover that partners contribute less than strangers, while Keser and
van Winden’s ﬁndings were the opposite, supporting the cooperation hypothesis
even without the opportunity of communication. Coricellia e.a. (2003) observed
yet higher cooperation when individuals are allowed to participate in partners’ pre-
selection. Fehr and G¨ achter (2000) showed that contribution increases substantially
in both partner and stranger conditions provided the subjects ex ante know they can
penalize non-contributors at a private cost. Finally, Rege and Telle (2003) observe
systematic increase in contribution in an experiment in Norway when, unlike the
standard setup, each person’s contribution is revealed to all participants.
Several explanations to high cooperation have been proposed in the literature.
One of these attributes this phenomenon to mistakes made by limitedly rational
individuals whose behaviour will tend to the Nash equilibria as they become more
experienced (Anderson e.a., 1998). Another explanation is based on reputation
building in the spirit of the ’gang of four’ (Kreps e.a., 1982): people who know they
play with each other in the same group (as partners) try to build a reputation of4 ALEXIS BELIANIN AND MARCO NOVARESE
being cooperative. Yet another hypothesis is that individuals do care of the others,
i.e. reveal pure altruism (individual utility increases in well-being of the others), or
warm-glow (individual utility increases in own contribution, regardless of the utility
of the others, which also depends on others’ contributions - see Palfrey and Prisbrey,
1997). Goeree e.a. (1999) and Carter e.a. (1992) separate the motive of altruism
(care of the others, or external motive) from that of increasing return to oneself
because of larger income from public account (the internal motive) by varying the
returns from public account accrued to the contributor and to the other members
of the group. Their conclusion was that the actual contribution is well-explained
by a mixture of external and internal motives. Ma e.a. (2002) split participants
into three groups formed on the ground of their degree of altruism measured by
a preliminary psychological test, but found no expected variance in contributions.
Finally, Goeree e.a. (1999), Anderson e.a. (1998) and Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997)
estimated the probability of contribution as a function of payoﬀs under various
utility speciﬁcation (linear or Cobb-Douglass) of own and others’ earnings, and
random mistakes whose probabilities are inversely related to the individual cost of
that decision.
Yet another argument is that of conditional contribution theory (Levati, 2002),
which says that individual contributions tend to the average contribution of the
group. This later can be inferred from the payoﬀ table at reasonable eﬀort, which
oﬀers a natural benchmark for anyone whose behaviour is not entirely selﬁsh, but
guided by the attitude of others. Intuitively, one would feel it ’uneasy’ and even
’ashamed’ of behaving in a way that goes at odd with what the others do. An inter-
esting demonstration of mutual dependence of contribution decision is obtained by
Levati and Neugebauer (2001) who used ascending clock (English auction) mech-
anism to indicate the amount the subjects want to contribute. Cooperation tends
to be more uniform in case of observable contributions, which fact itself may not
depend on the clock. Housera and Kurzban (2003) and Potters e.a. (2003) used
sequential contributions by forcing the players to make their decisions upon observ-
ing moves of the others, and by making the true value of the public good known
only to some subjects who may revise their choices. In both cases contributions
raised in comparison to the benchmark case.
In recent years, several explanations to high cooperation in PG game were pro-
posed from evolutionary perspective. Carpenter (2002) describes actual behaviour
through conformity with that of the group as captured by the familiar replica-
tor dynamics of evolutionary game theory; see Clemens and Reichmann (2001)
for another application of the same tools. Montoro-Pons and Garcia-Sobrecases
(2000) derive the evolution of cooperation from the relative success of the existing
strategies and imitation of others’ behaviour which evolve according to a variant
of ﬁctitious play dynamics. Levati (2002), building on the approach of G¨ uth and
Yaari (1992), justiﬁes cooperation as an evolutionary stable strategy in conditional
cooperation framework, so that the individual payoﬀ is
(2) ui(c) = vi(c) − ri max(0,¯ c − ci)
Unlike (1), this function also depends on a parameter ri ≥ 0 is the regret parameter
reﬂecting psychological pain for contributing less than the average. An important
drawback of (2) is that it is never optimal to contribute less than the average,
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of explanations derive high cooperation from reciprocity, or fairness considerations
(Rabin, 1993), or from inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
Despite this abundance of experimental evidence and explanations, cross-country
studies of the PG game have so far not been quite abundant, with a notable excep-
tion of Henrich e.a. 2001. Our work contributes to that kind of research, which we
ﬁnd worthwhile for at least two reasons. First, the stylized facts obtained in some
countries may not hold across diﬀerent cultures. For instance, Cason e.a. (2003)
conducted an ingenious two-stage common pool experiment (inspired by Sajio and
Jamato, 1999) in which Japanese subjects at ﬁrst decided whether they will con-
tribute or not, then learn each others’ decisions, and only then decide upon the
size of their personal contributions. The authors found the level of cooperation
to be rather low and decreasing with time, which fact they attribute to people’s
spitefulness (disappointment of non-cooperativeness of the opponents), and call
for ”rethinking our fundamental assumptions of human nature” (Cason e.a., 2003,
p.18). Before reaching this conclusion, however, it will be interesting to know
whether this result might be due to the fact that it has been conducted in Japan -
a country of rather idiosyncratic cultural traditions and values2.
Second, the PG game is a stylized, yet very instructive method to see the ex-
tent and possibly also motives for people’s cooperation, both within and across
countries. The need to study that kind of phenomena became especially apparent
with the emergence and expansion of the European Union: how successful will be
the cooperation of people representing diﬀerent nationalities within this new en-
tity? And, within the context of a public goods game, could the subjects grown in a
modern market economy ﬁnd a common ground with the subjects from a transition
economy struggling with a long systemic crisis? These questions can be usefully
addressed within the frame of our experiment in real time.
3. Experimental design and methods
The experiment consisted of three sessions classical PG voluntary contribution
games with w = 10 and k = 1/3. Two of these were played by the Russians only
and the Italians only; these were used as controls for the main cross-cultural session
played by mixed Russian-Italian group which convene at the same (real) time in
Moscow and Alessandria. Altogether there were 24 participants from both Russian
and Italian side. Russian subjects were second- and third-year students of ICEF
who specialize in Economics; they played in ICEF computer class. Italians were
university students in Law attending diﬀerent years of the their academic career
and just occasional training in economics at an introductory level; they played
at the Centro Alex of the Universit` a del Piemonte Orientale. All sessions were
conducted using an experimental software developed at ICEF (Moscow) and stored
at ICEF local web-server, but available through Internet at a password-protected
site (http://mief.hse.ru). The entire experiment was conducted in English, which
language was commonly familiar to all subjects.
At the beginning of each session the experimenters on both sides collected the
subjects’ consent forms and distributed logins and passwords for the participants
who used them to log on to the game. The experimenters introduced the par-
ticipants to the game environment, read aloud the instructions (available in the
Appendix), and answered the questions.
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Table 1. Summary of experimental design
Italian-Russian session (gender identities unknown)
Groups\Treatment Game 1 (no cheap-talk) Game 2 (preceded by cheap-talk)
A Mix males Italian 
B Mix females Russian 
C Italian Mix  1
D Russian Mix  2
Single-country sessions (gender identities known)
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3
2 Male-female groups, no 
cheap talk
2 Male-female groups, 
preceded by cheap talk
All-male and all-female group, no cheap 
talk (but 2-games experience)
Table 2. Mean volatility of bids across sessions
Session\Treatment Game 1 (no cheap-talk) Game 2 (preceded by cheap-talk)
Italian 2.8 (n=6) 1.8 (n=6)
mixed 4.4 (n=12) 6.7 (n=12)
Russian 6.4 (n=6) 11.0 (n=6)
F test (anova): F=2.87, p value 0.079 F test (anova): F=5.60, p value 0.011
K-W: chi-squared 5.9, p value: 0.053 K-W: chi-squared 7.4, p value: 0.024
Each of the three sessions consisted of two or three replicas of the same PG game
of 12 rounds in the groups of 6 players according to the rules speciﬁed below. For
the cross-country experiment we have chosen a block design with several treatment
dimensions (see Table 1). The ﬁrst treatment was country: the subjects in the
groups represented either the same country (referred as to Italian or Russian groups)
or a mixture of subjects from two countries (referred as to Mix). Subjects were
told the nationality of the other players in their group, but not the proportion
of Italians or Russians in the Mix group (in reality, the composition was always
50-50). The second treatment was the opportunity of ’cheap talk’, which gave the
subjects a chance to share their views of the game, and try to coordinate their future
actions. This treatment was implemented as follows. The ﬁrst game in each of the
three sessions precluded any form of communication or cheap-talk: subjects were
strictly prohibited to reveal their identities or negotiate their strategies, although
they might record their choices and scores. After the ﬁrst game of 12 rounds was
over, the subjects were invited to the second game of the same length, but before
the game started, they were given a chance to exchange their views in a specially
electronic forum integrated into the experimental system. This discussion lasted
for 20 minutes, during which the participants were identiﬁed by their logins, and
explicitly prohibited to reveal their real identities, including nationality. Logs of
this cheap-talk session constitutes additional information which sheds some light
into how did the players make their decisions.
Finally, we were interested in gender eﬀect, both within and across countries. We
expected this eﬀect to be signiﬁcant regardless of subjects’ knowledge of the gender
identities of their partners: Holt and Laury (1997, p.213) report that women par-
ticipants are more often less cooperative than male participants; evidence collected
by one of us (Belianin, 1998) suggests that Russian females are systematically more
cooperative than Russian males3. To test for this eﬀect, we played one more game
in both control (Russian only and Italian only) sessions. Both control groups were
balanced in terms of gender, consisting of 6 male and 6 female participants each.
Accordingly, following the cheap talk game, the whole procedure was was repeated
once again again in two groups, one of which consisted of all males, another - of all
females; this time without any cheap talk, but with known gender identities. This
design is summarized in the bottom part of Table 1. Given that the PG games are
shown to be nonsensitive to monetary rewards, we used a nonpecuniar but easily
3Originally we have envisaged a completely randomized block design, however, the last treat-
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understandable incentive: percentage points to the total mark for the courses taken
by the participants. Italian participants were granted additional credits necessary
for their academic career on the ground of the score obtained. Russian participants
were told that the player who will earn the most in both groups will be entitled
for 10% of the total coursemark; the other participants will receive the number of
percentage points proportional to their earnings during the experiment.
4. Results
Figures 1, 2 and 3 plot the average bids for all three sessions. As can be seen from
the ﬁgures, these were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, rejecting the hypothesis of
equilibrium behaviour, although the extent of this deviation varied signiﬁcantly
from session to session. Figure 1a shows average bids from the mixed session before
cheap talk for the various treatments; ﬁgure 1b shows the behaviour of the same
groups of people after cheap talk. The graphs reveal systematic upward deviations
from the cheap talk session in comparison to no-cheap talk session, as summarized
in ﬁgure 1c for the mixed sessions, implying that cheap talk enhances coopera-
tion. The diﬀerence between both the ﬁrst-period contributions (interpreted as the
single-shot, or initial contribution) and the average contributions over all twelve
periods were signiﬁcant in means and medians. Further, the distributions of initial
bids and overall bids were again signiﬁcantly diﬀerent according to Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test at any reasonable degree of conﬁdence. Hypotheses that these obser-
vations were drawn from the same population were conﬁdently rejected too by the
Mann-Whitney test for the initial bids (z = −4.16) and all bids (z = −7.23). This
diﬀerence might of course be partly attributable to learning eﬀect rather than to
that of communication. However, we do not think this explanation is quite com-
pelling because all groups have undergone the same treatment in the ﬁrst part.
These conclusions do not hold for the other two sessions - all-Russian and all-
Italian, whose average bids are plotted on Figures 2a and 2b respectively (median
trends are quite similar, and thus are omitted). The only case where the dif-
ference was marginally signiﬁcant was overall bidding pattern of the all-Russian
session (Student t-test for the equality of means returns t = −2.38,p < 0.017;
Mann-Whitney z = −2.32,p < 0.02), suggesting there was no signiﬁcant eﬀect
of cheap-talk. This result might appear rather unusual: textbook wisdom of so-
cial psychologists tells us that people are more fair and altruistic when dealing
with persons belonging to the same group, which would have suggested the oppo-
site conclusion. A possible interpretation of our observations is that cross-cultural
character in fact enhances cooperativeness, as the desire to ”be nice” is larger for
someone whom you do not know and who belongs to a diﬀerent culture.
This conclusion would be yet more interesting when contrasted with the par-
ticipants’ own reaction on each other bids as revealed during the email interviews
which have been arranged after the sessions. Within the frame of our experiment
this has been done by means of a separate questionnaire sent out to all participants
which revealed their attitudes towards the game, satisfaction with its results and
perception of the PG environment in cross-country perspective. Based in these in-
terviews, the following conclusions can be made. First, almost all participants have
appreciated the cheap-talk session, and unanimously argued that it helped them to
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Figure 2b. Average contributions by period
to the benchmark bid to which they felt motivated to adhere. Thus, conforming
the ﬁnding of Isaac e.a. (1988) and others, even nonbinding communication can
indeed contribute to higher social coordination if only all parties see some beneﬁt
of it. Second, cross-country diﬀerences do not appear to be signiﬁcant: both Italian
and Russian participants said they did not notice any diﬀerence between the play
of diﬀerent nationalities. This observation probably suggests that, while the fact
of interaction with the strangers might create extra incentives for higher cooper-
ation, it need not cause any perceptive problem - in other words, individuals in
cross-country context may be exceedingly well-disposed towards each other, even
without noticing it themselves.
The Mann-Whitney test may be somewhat misleading because it assumes that
observations came from independent samples, whereas in fact they came from the
same. A more appropriate method in this context would be to apply Wilcoxon
matched pairs test for the same individual before communication and after com-
munication. This test convincingly shows that the above conjecture of signiﬁcant
diﬀerence is valid for a mixed group (z = −7.43 for the ﬁrst and -3.55 for the overall
contributions, signiﬁcant at a 1% level), whereas none of the null hypotheses can
be rejected in both all-Russian and all-Italian sessions.
We have also evaluated the regularities in people’s behavior across sessions. As
can be seen from the ﬁgures, Russians’ average bids are typically somewhat more
volatile than that of the Italians - but how robust is this ﬁnding on individual
basis? We have estimated the volatility of bids by computing, for each person,
the variance among all oﬀers in the same session. These results are summarized
in table 2, which shows the mean values of such variances. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences
imply that Russians indeed exhibit more variability, which may be attributable toCROSS-COUNTRY PUBLIC GOODS GAME 11
Table 1. Summary of experimental design
Italian-Russian session (gender identities unknown)
Groups\Treatment Game 1 (no cheap-talk) Game 2 (preceded by cheap-talk)
A Mix males Italian 
B Mix females Russian 
C Italian Mix  1
D Russian Mix  2
Single-country sessions (gender identities known)
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3
2 Male-female groups, no 
cheap talk
2 Male-female groups, 
preceded by cheap talk
All-male and all-female group, no cheap 
talk (but 2-games experience)
Table 2. Mean volatility of bids across sessions
Session\Treatment Game 1 (no cheap-talk) Game 2 (preceded by cheap-talk)
Italian 2.8 (n=6) 1.8 (n=6)
mixed 4.4 (n=12) 6.7 (n=12)
Russian 6.4 (n=6) 11.0 (n=6)
F test (anova): F=2.87, p value 0.079 F test (anova): F=5.60, p value 0.011
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Figure 3. Average contributions by period
lower stability of economic environment in the country. The problem is that the
observation within each group may be dependent (i.e. as you change continuously
your decision, I do the same) and therefore this test may be misleading - an issue
which is worth theoretical exploration. The last ﬁgure 3 shows another contrast
which is fairly interesting: the gender diﬀerence in contributions for the Russian
and Italian sessions. Italian male and female groups demonstrate a pretty close
pattern with no signiﬁcant diﬀerences. This is not the case of the all-Russian
group: here females are constantly and increasingly cooperative, whereas males’
cooperation demonstrates rather irregular waves. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at
any reasonable degree of conﬁdence (Student t-statistic = 4.65; the other tests reveal
signiﬁcant diﬀerences too). This observation may of course be due to sampling error;
nevertheless previous results obtained by one of the author (Belianin, 1998) reveal
the same tendency of amazingly high degree of cooperation among Russian women.
The present experiment shows that this result does not extend to other populations
and samples, which suggests that this observation might constitute a peculiarity of
the Russian subjects.12 ALEXIS BELIANIN AND MARCO NOVARESE
5. Conclusion
The experimental evidence presented above allows us to make three sorts of
conclusions. First, cross-country experimentation in real time is an interesting
mechanism compatible to the single-country experiments. Second, in our case we
found that cheap-talk enhances cooperation when the groups are formed out of
members of diﬀerent nations, rather than by a single-country nationals, which seem
to contradict the conventional wisdom. Third, gender eﬀects seem to be present,
especially in Russian context. Further exploration of these phenomena can result
in new insights light into the character and nature of human behavior in diﬀerent
cultures and in theoretically unambiguous circumstances.
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E EX XP PE ER RI IM ME EN NT TA AL L   I IN NS ST TR RU UC CT TI IO ON NS S   
Today you are participating in an economic experiment called "Public goods game". The 
experiment consists of two consecutive sessions or "games" that will be played by the same 
cohort of participants. At the end of the session you may be approached by an interviewer by 
email who will ask you several questions about your behaviour during the game. The entire 
experiment should take approximately two hours. Now your experimenter will ask you to 
confirm in written your willingness to participate in this experiment by signing the Subject 
Consent Form. Please read it carefully and if you agree, state your name, date and sign it. 
Game 1 
For game 1, you will be allocated to one of four groups, labeled A, B, C and D. This 
allocation will be made by the experimenter who will give you a piece of paper with your login 
and password for the game. This is your ONLY identifier during game 1. All over the 
experiment YOU ARE NOT ALLOWED to communicate your true name and surname, or 
reveal your identity to any other player – either online or in the classroom you are sitting. Please 
also do not start playing before you will be explicitly authorized by the experimenter. 
1. Please go to http://mief.hse.ru in your Internet browser and type your login and 
password in the two windows provided therein. (For the login, please do not forget to insert 
space between "player" and your identity, e.g. "A1". Upper- or lowercase letters are immaterial – 
you may use either). 
You will be logged on to the system. 
2. Please switch the interface by clicking "English" in the upper right corner of the 
screen. 
3. Go to the bottom of the screen and click on "Public goods game" 
4. Choose the game which begins with the same letter as your login. That is, if your login 
is "player A3", choose " Game A(I)", if your login is "player C2", choose "Game C(I)" etc.). 
5. Now the experimenter will read you the instruction for game 1, which is also available 
on your screen. Please pay special attention to the first sentence of this instruction which tells 
you who are the other members of your group. YOU ARE NOT TO REVEAL THIS 
INFORMATION to anyone else – either online or in the classroom you are sitting. 
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS? 
 After you have completed this session, please write down the number of points (Total 
income) you have earned during Game 1, quit the system by clicking "Exit" at the bottom of the 
left panel on the screen. You will be logged off to the login and password screen. 
Game 2 
Now we begin game 2, which will be similar to the previous one with a few changes. For 
this game the experimenter will issue to you a new login and password. This is your ONLY 
identifier for game 2. All over the experiment YOU ARE NOT ALLOWED to communicate 
your true name and surname, or reveal your identity to any other player – either online or in the 
classroom. Please also do not start playing before you will be explicitly authorized by the 
experimenter. 
1. As before, go to http://mief.hse.ru in your Internet browser and type your login and 
password (For the login, please do not forget to insert space between "player" and your identity, 
e.g. "A10".) You will be logged on to the system. 
2. Switch the interface by clicking "English" in the upper right corner of the screen. 
3. Go to the bottom of the screen and click on "Public goods game". 
4. Choose the game which begins with the same letter as your login. That is, if your login 
is "player A8", choose " Game A(II)", if your login is "player C12", choose "Game C(II)" etc.). 
5. Now the experimenter will read you the instruction for game 2, which is also available 
on your screen. Please pay special attention to the first sentence of this instruction which tells 
you who are the other members of your group. YOU ARE NOT TO REVEAL THIS 
INFORMATION to anyone else – either online or in the classroom you are sitting. 
6. Before this session you will be given a chance to discuss the strategy for this game 
with other members of your group. Now you may do it using the forum provided (click "Open in 
a new window" below the word "Forum"). You may share your views, make your suggestions 
about the strategy for yourself and your groupmates etc. The system will automatically sign your 
messages by your login name "player A7", "player B10" etc. Remember that YOU ARE NOT 
ALLOWED TO REVEAL YOUR PERSONALITY to anyone else. To see the last messages in 
your forum do not forget to refresh the screen by pressing F5. You will be given 25 minutes for 
this discussion. 
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS? 
After you have completed this session, please write down the number of points (Total 
income) you have earned during Game 2, and quit the system by clicking "Exit" at the bottom of 
the left panel on the screen. You will be logged off. 
 